On October 19, IRGC spokesman Hossein Mohebbi told a ceremony in Tehran that seven major internet cables run beneath the Strait of Hormuz, warning that new targets and weapons would soon be revealed. He added that Iran’s response would be significantly harsher this time.
The warning followed a series of statements signaling growing Iranian interest in the region’s digital infrastructure.
Earlier in October, Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohsen Rezaei said Iran could target U.S.-linked cables, data centers, and AI facilities in a future conflict. In May, the IRGC warned that every cable crossing the strait could be subjected to Iranian permitting requirements.
Iran’s figure of seven is close to the current total. Six operational subsea cable systems cross the strait: 2Africa, AAE-1, FALCON, Gulf Bridge International (GBI), Tata TGN-Gulf, and OMRAN/EPEG. Two additional systems, FIG and SEA-ME-WE 6, are under construction and expected to enter service in 2027, bringing the total to eight. According to TeleGeography data, Iran’s estimate falls between the number of operational systems and the projected total.
The Cables That Cross the Strait
The region’s subsea infrastructure connects Gulf states to international telecommunications networks, making the Strait of Hormuz a critical passage for regional and international data traffic.
- 2Africa: Its Gulf branch serves Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman. The consortium includes Meta, Orange, Vodafone, China Mobile, center3, Telecom Egypt, WIOCC, and Bayobab.
- AAE-1: Connects Qatar, the UAE, Oman, and Saudi Arabia through its regional branches. Its consortium includes e&, Ooredoo, Zain, Omantel, Mobily, China Unicom, and PCCW.
- FALCON: Connects Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, and Iran. It is operated by FLAG.
- Gulf Bridge International (GBI): Serves Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, and Iran.
- Tata TGN-Gulf: Connects Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman.
- OMRAN/EPEG: Connects Oman, including Khasab, Diba, and Barka, with Iran. Regional operators include Zain, Omantel, and Vodafone.
- FIG (expected in 2027): Planned to serve Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman. Ooredoo is associated with the system.
- SEA-ME-WE 6 (expected in 2027): Planned to connect Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Oman, and Saudi Arabia.
Four Countries Have Few Alternatives
Exposure to a disruption in the Strait of Hormuz varies considerably across the Gulf. The key factor is not simply how many cables a country has, but where those cables connect to international networks.
Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar face the greatest geographical constraints because their subsea connections to the outside world depend on infrastructure within the Gulf. Their international connectivity is therefore particularly vulnerable to a disruption around Hormuz.
Iraq has three operational cable systems, all landing at Al Faw. Kuwait has five, Bahrain five, and Qatar seven. However, some systems, including FOG, Qatar-UAE, and Kuwait-Iran, remain within the Gulf rather than providing independent routes beyond it. This leaves Kuwait with three external routes, Bahrain with four, and Qatar with five.
Iraq is pursuing an alternative through a planned terrestrial connection from Al Faw to the Turkish border, with Ooredoo involved in the project. Such a route could reduce reliance on subsea infrastructure passing through the strait.
The UAE has greater geographic flexibility. Six cables land on its Gulf coast, while 14 connect at Fujairah and Kalba on the Gulf of Oman, outside the Strait of Hormuz. These connections provide an alternative to the strait, although they are not necessarily beyond the reach of a broader regional conflict.
Oman also benefits from multiple coastal landing points. Two cables land at Khasab, 11 along its Gulf of Oman coast, and five at Salalah and Qalhat on the Arabian Sea.
Saudi Arabia is comparatively well positioned, with four cable connections at Al Khobar and 14 on the Red Sea coast at Jeddah, Yanbu, Duba, and Haql. However, alternative routes are not immune to disruption. Two Red Sea cables were cut near Jeddah in September 2025, demonstrating that risks extend beyond Hormuz.
Sanctioned Tankers Were Already Operating Above Cable Corridors
The October 19 warning came amid vessel movements that had already drawn attention to the region’s subsea infrastructure.
In the two weeks before Mohebbi’s remarks, maritime intelligence firm Windward tracked two U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)-sanctioned tankers linked to Iran. Both spent extended periods drifting over regional cable corridors while carrying no cargo, despite having recorded destinations.
The first vessel had been sanctioned by OFAC in September 2024 for transporting cargo on behalf of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force.
After idling off Khor Fakkan, the tanker sailed toward Muscat at approximately 11 knots. On September 30, it slowed to less than one knot near regional cable routes and remained in the area for 73 hours before resuming its voyage toward the Suez Canal.
Its movements were notable for their duration and proximity to critical infrastructure. The vessel arrived under power before drifting at an average speed of approximately 0.6 knots with its engine off. During this period, it passed across the edges of the AAE-1, Bay of Bengal Gateway, and 2Africa corridors, and came within half a nautical mile of FALCON, GBI, and MENA. It subsequently departed southeast at 10–11 knots.
Four days before the extended drift, the vessel had changed its Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI), call sign, and flag code.
Neither vessel’s movements can be definitively classified as a subsea cable survey. The available information does not establish that either ship carried out surveillance or attempted to interfere with the infrastructure.
The narrower finding is nevertheless significant: two sanctioned vessels with Iranian links, both apparently in ballast and with destinations already recorded, made multi-day stops over cable corridors in the weeks before Iran publicly threatened the systems. Both subsequently resumed normal speeds.
There are technical reasons why such activity warrants attention. Subsea infrastructure can be investigated without direct contact with the seabed. Hull-mounted multibeam sonar can survey a broad area, while compact deep-water survey systems can be installed aboard commercial vessels. However, there is no confirmed evidence that such equipment was used during these incidents.
Cutting the Cables Could Disrupt Iran as Well
Iran’s threats face a practical constraint: some of the same cable systems it could target also serve its own international connectivity.
FALCON and GBI both have landing points in Iran, at Bandar Abbas and Bushehr, respectively. Damaging either system could therefore disrupt Iranian connections alongside those of other Gulf states. OMRAN/EPEG also links Oman and Iran, creating a similar vulnerability.
This does not eliminate the threat. Instead, it introduces the possibility of selective targeting.
Systems such as 2Africa and Tata TGN-Gulf do not land in Iran. The planned FIG and SEA-ME-WE 6 systems are also not designed to land there. Targeting these systems could allow Iran to disrupt regional connectivity while limiting some of the direct consequences for its own networks.
Such selectivity would require detailed knowledge of individual cable routes, landing points, and network dependencies. This is one reason the reported vessel activity deserves scrutiny, even though it does not establish that reconnaissance took place.
What to Watch Next
Three developments could help determine whether Iran’s statements remain political warnings or signal more concrete preparations.
First, watch for further vessel activity. Repeated, unexplained loitering by Iranian-linked vessels near subsea cable corridors in the Gulf and Arabian Sea would warrant closer attention, particularly around systems that do not connect directly to Iran.
Second, monitor Iraq’s terrestrial connectivity plans. A land-based route linking Al Faw to Turkey could offer an alternative to the vulnerable maritime passage. Progress on the project would indicate whether one of the most exposed countries is making tangible efforts to diversify its international connectivity.
Third, watch the development of new cable systems. FIG and SEA-ME-WE 6 are both expected to enter service in 2027. Whether their routes, landing points, or deployment plans change in response to regional security concerns could provide an indication of how seriously operators view the threat.
The vulnerability of subsea infrastructure around the Strait of Hormuz is not new, and it cannot be eliminated quickly. What has changed is that Iranian officials have publicly identified these cables as potential targets. Reports of unusual vessel movements near the same infrastructure in the preceding weeks add another dimension to the concern.
Those movements are not proof of a coordinated operation. But together, the public warnings and the vessel activity raise a consequential question for regional security: whether the infrastructure carrying the Gulf’s international data traffic is becoming a more explicit target in a future confrontation.
