NEW DELHI: China’s renewed assertion that the Shaksgam Valley “belongs to China” has reopened a long-dormant but highly sensitive fault line in the Kashmir dispute. Beijing’s defence of infrastructure construction in the area—closely linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—has drawn a sharp rebuttal from New Delhi, which has reiterated that the territory is an “integral and inalienable part of India”.
The disagreement goes far beyond semantics. At stake are questions of territorial sovereignty, India’s claims over Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), China’s expanding footprint in the western Himalayas, and the future of regional connectivity linking Xinjiang, Gilgit-Baltistan and the Arabian Sea.
Here is a breakdown of the issue, its origins and why it matters.
What is the Shaksgam Valley?
Also known as the Trans-Karakoram Tract, the Shaksgam Valley is a sparsely populated, high-altitude region located north of the Siachen Glacier. It borders China’s Xinjiang province to the north, Pakistan-occupied Gilgit-Baltistan to the south and west, and the Siachen region to the east.
While geographically harsh and inhospitable, politically it is among the most sensitive areas in the Kashmir matrix. India maintains that Shaksgam was part of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and therefore legally belongs to India. Pakistan, which controls parts of Jammu and Kashmir since 1947, transferred control of the area to China in 1963—a move India has never recognised. China today administers the territory as part of Xinjiang and treats it as sovereign Chinese land.
What is the dispute about?
At the heart of the dispute lies the question of legal authority.
India’s position is clear: Pakistan, as an occupying power in PoK, had no right to cede any part of Jammu and Kashmir to a third country. Any agreement signed by Pakistan over that territory is therefore “illegal and invalid”.
China and Pakistan reject this view. They argue that the 1963 China-Pakistan boundary agreement was a sovereign decision between two independent states aimed at demarcating their frontier and stabilising a previously undefined border.
Beijing’s latest statement—that infrastructure development in the region is “fully justified”—signals that China considers the matter settled from its perspective.
Why does Shaksgam Valley matter strategically?
Despite its remote terrain, the region carries major strategic weight.
Proximity to Siachen and Ladakh:
The valley lies close to the Siachen Glacier, where Indian and Pakistani troops have faced off for decades. Chinese activity introduces a third strategic actor into an already volatile zone.
China-Pakistan strategic depth:
The territory creates direct contiguity between Xinjiang and Gilgit-Baltistan, strengthening coordination between China and Pakistan—an outcome made possible only after the 1963 agreement.
Military and logistics implications:
Infrastructure development enhances China’s capacity to move troops, equipment and supplies near India’s northern frontiers, particularly in Ladakh.
Precedent for territorial claims:
For India, any acceptance of Chinese control would weaken its legal position on PoK and undermine the 1994 parliamentary resolution affirming that the entire region of Jammu and Kashmir belongs to India.
What has India said?
India’s response has been firm and consistent. MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal has categorically rejected both China’s claim and Pakistan’s role in enabling it.
“Shaksgam Valley is Indian territory. We have never recognised the so-called China-Pakistan boundary agreement of 1963,” he said at a briefing.
He added that India does not recognise CPEC either, as it passes through territory “under the forcible and illegal occupation of Pakistan”. Jaiswal reaffirmed that the entire Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh are an integral part of India and said New Delhi has consistently protested attempts to change the status quo in the Shaksgam Valley.
Notably, India has also stated that it reserves the right to take necessary measures to safeguard its interests—language that signals both diplomatic and strategic options remain open.
What has China said?
China’s position has been equally blunt. Foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning dismissed India’s objections, stating: “The territory you mentioned belongs to China. It is fully justified for China to carry out infrastructure construction on its own territory.”
She said China and Pakistan signed a boundary agreement in the 1960s to demarcate their border in the exercise of sovereign rights. On India’s criticism of CPEC, she reiterated that the project is aimed at development and improving livelihoods.
Mao also insisted that the boundary agreement and CPEC do not affect China’s stated position that the Kashmir issue should be resolved peacefully under UN resolutions and bilateral agreements.
What is the 1963 China-Pakistan boundary agreement?
Signed on March 2, 1963, the agreement transferred about 5,180 sq km of territory in the Shaksgam Valley from Pakistan-controlled Kashmir to China.
Pakistan described the arrangement as provisional, pending a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute, and included a clause stating that the boundary would be renegotiated once the issue was resolved. India rejected the agreement outright, arguing that Pakistan had no authority to sign away territory that legally belonged to India.
For China and Pakistan, however, the deal created a shared border and laid the foundation for their long-term strategic partnership.
Why does India call the agreement illegal?
India’s objections rest on three core arguments:
- Pakistan is an occupying power: It cannot legally transfer territory that belongs to India.
- Violation of sovereignty: Any change to Jammu and Kashmir’s borders without India’s consent infringes on its territorial integrity.
- Dangerous precedent: Accepting the agreement would legitimise third-party involvement in the Kashmir dispute.
This position has remained consistent across Indian governments for decades.
What is CPEC and how does it link to Shaksgam?
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is a flagship Belt and Road Initiative project valued at around $60 billion. It connects Xinjiang to Pakistan’s Gwadar port via roads, railways, energy projects and industrial zones.
Parts of CPEC pass through Gilgit-Baltistan, which India considers part of PoK. While Shaksgam is not the most visible stretch of the corridor, its integration into China’s logistics ecosystem strengthens Beijing’s western connectivity and reinforces Pakistan’s role as China’s gateway to the Arabian Sea.
India argues that CPEC directly violates its sovereignty and has warned other countries against participating in projects that pass through PoK.
Why is China accelerating infrastructure here now?
Several factors appear to be driving Beijing’s assertiveness:
- Securing Xinjiang’s western approaches
- Protecting CPEC assets amid militant threats in Pakistan
- Signalling resolve after border standoffs in eastern Ladakh
- Reinforcing territorial claims through physical presence
Infrastructure, in this context, serves both practical and political purposes.
Where does Pakistan stand?
Pakistan has backed China’s position, maintaining that the 1963 agreement is valid and that CPEC is central to its economic future. Islamabad has announced the creation of a Special Protection Unit to safeguard Chinese nationals working on CPEC projects, underscoring the corridor’s importance to bilateral ties.
India, however, continues to accuse Pakistan of illegally trading away territory that does not belong to it.
What happens next?
In the short term, the issue is likely to remain a diplomatic standoff: India will continue to lodge protests, while China proceeds with its projects.
Over the longer term, Shaksgam Valley could emerge as another pressure point in the already tense India-China relationship—especially if infrastructure development alters the strategic balance near Ladakh and Siachen.
Though remote and sparsely populated, the Shaksgam Valley sits at the crossroads of India-China rivalry, Pakistan’s territorial manoeuvres and China’s westward expansion. Beijing’s renewed claim and New Delhi’s firm rejection suggest that what was once a footnote in the Kashmir dispute is fast re-emerging as a live geopolitical fault line—one with the potential to shape the Himalayan strategic landscape for years to come.
