With container diversions from the Strait of Hormuz surging since late February 2026, Drewry examines whether the GCC’s alternative port capacity and inland logistics infrastructure can realistically absorb displaced container cargo volumes – and finds a region structurally exposed by decades of underinvestment in bypass corridors.
The Strait of Hormuz
For decades there have been concerns over the impact of a potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow, bendy sea-passage between Iran and the UAE/Oman peninsula (which provides the origin of the expression ‘going round the bend’) connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean.
Through this vital chokepoint passes 15-30% of the global seaborne crude oil, refined oil product, LNG, LPG, petrochemical and fertiliser trade.
On the other hand, the container trade handled by ports in the Persian Gulf makes up only c. 3.5% of global port handling (2024 figures). Even though this is a surprisingly modest proportion, it still matters because Hormuz is the only maritime gateway for several entire national economies, including Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Iraq.
The scale of exposure
The Persian Gulf handles approximately 33 mTEU annually across UAE, Saudi, Kuwaiti, Qatari and Bahraini Gulf-side terminals. Jebel Ali, the region’s dominant hub, processes around 15.5 mTEU per year, with Khalifa Port adding a further 6.6 mTEU in 2025. Both sit entirely behind the Hormuz chokepoint.
The importance of these ports is underscored by connectivity data. Drewry’s Port Connectivity Index Score for Jebel Ali stood at 16.0 in Q1 2026 (pre-war), while Khalifa Port registered 9.4 – the fastest-rising score in the region. Combined, the two Abu Dhabi and Dubai hubs represent by far the deepest liner connectivity in the Middle East. With Hormuz closed, more than three-quarters of that connectivity has gone dark.
Bypass port capacity: The numbers
Drewry has assessed the latent container capacity across the principal bypass ports available to GCC trade. In aggregate, these ports offer over 20 mTEU of spare annual capacity – a figure that appears substantial on paper but is heavily qualified by geography and logistics realities.
The relief valve that works – and those that don’t
Khorfakkan is the only port where bypass utility is genuinely high. At 130km from Dubai via a good dual carriageway, it can absorb some additional Dubai-bound volume with limited additional infrastructure. UAE authorities have already implemented emergency customs clearance procedures allowing direct road transfer to Jebel Ali and Abu Dhabi free zones – a pragmatic measure that validates the corridor’s pre-existing role. Road absorption capacity is uncertain and would require traffic modelling but is likely to be a fraction of Khorfakkan’s physical port capacity headroom.
Sohar is an increasingly important port for Oman and has good road access to Abu Dhabi (c. 280 km via Al Buraimi/ Al Ain border crossing), and to Jebel Ali and Dubai (c. 230 km via the Al Wajajah/ Hatta border crossing). The potential of the latter route has been recognised with a declaration on 12th March activating a ‘green corridor’ between Dubai and Omani ports for ‘shipments transferred through land routes’.
Salalah presents the most acute paradox: 3.0 mTEU of latent capacity, but located 1,700 km by road from Dubai through remote desert with no freight railway. A 40 ft container trucked from Salalah to Dubai costs an estimated $3,000-$5,000 (based on per-kilometre benchmarks) versus $200-$400 drayage from Jebel Ali. As a Gulf supply chain bypass, it is effectively disconnected. It can, however, handle some of the transhipment cargo bound for the East African and South Asian markets traditionally handled in Jebel Ali. Important to note however, that while the port is outside the Gulf, it is still in striking distance from Iran as the recent attack on oil facilities showed
Red Sea ports – Jeddah, King Abdullah and Duba (NEOM) – offer meaningful capacity for Saudi domestic consumption, but there is currently no rail connection between Jeddah and Riyadh. The Saudi Landbridge, the 950-km freight railway that would create this link, remains unbuilt, with construction tenders not expected until mid-2026 and completion targeted for the early 2030s. Without it, all Red Sea-Gulf hinterland container movement must go by road, approximately 950 km Jeddah-Riyadh and 1,400 km Jeddah-Dammam. For Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Iraq, none of which have viable overland bypass routes that avoid either Hormuz or Saudi territorial transit, no adequate alternative exists.
Transhipment disruption
The closure compounds port disruption with hub disruption. Jebel Ali’s transhipment ratio, approximately 65% of throughput when re-exports are included, means that cargo losses extend well beyond UAE gateway trade. Gulf feeder services to Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain, accounting for an estimated 1.2-1.5 mTEU annually through Jebel Ali alone, can operate as long as cargo can be delivered to Jebel Ali via Khorfakkan/Fujairah/Sohar.
Khalifa Port’s 65% transhipment ratio reveals a similar structural exposure, compounded by Abu Dhabi spending approximately $1 billion in 2022–2025 attracting COSCO and CMA CGM to use Khalifa as their regional hub. That investment is now stranded behind the same chokepoint. The port’s sole physical bypass advantage, an Etihad Rail connection to Fujairah, provides at best 50,000 TEU per year of relief capacity (based on a very aggressive ramp up to a daily container train). All relay transhipment previously handled in Abu Dhabi will be moved to Southeast Asian, South Asian, North African or Mediterranean hub ports.
Drewry assessment: Three-stage outlook
0-6 months: Severe disruption; partial mitigation only. UAE east-coast ports can absorb perhaps 60–70% of UAE-local consumer import volumes. Saudi Arabia can partially re-route domestic cargo through Jeddah and King Abdullah Port. Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Iraq face acute shortages with no adequate bypass option. Food security and reefer cargo are the critical stress points within weeks.
6-24 months: Adaptation possible but economically devastating. Emergency crane and yard investment at Khorfakkan is deliverable within 12-18 months. Carriers redeploy tonnage to Sohar for trucking-based landbridges. Saudi landbridge upgrades expand rail volumes modestly. Air defense ramped up. Logistics costs across the Gulf rise an estimated 3-5x. Upper Gulf states remain fundamentally exposed.
24+ months: A prolonged closure would be the forcing catalyst for transformative investment that Gulf governments have deferred for four decades. The GCC Railway – long planned, never built – and a Jeddah-Dammam-Kuwait container rail corridor would become economic necessities. Duqm’s development as a true container hub is a 3-5-year investment horizon. The structural vulnerabilities are fixable, but not quickly. Air defence to become a major requirement enabling regional logistics.
Our view
The Arabian Gulf states have collectively underinvested in Hormuz bypass infrastructure despite four decades of clear strategic risk. The current disruption confirms that no combination of available bypass ports and inland logistics can fully substitute for Hormuz access in the short term. The region’s liner connectivity depth is its greatest strength – and, in a closure scenario, its greatest single point of failure.
Source: Drewry
